Scientific Aspect

Turning now to consider the scientific aspect of these questions, there is one thing I would say, however, by the way of preface. We must not think that Scripture is waiting upon science to get its credentials thence. Thank God, for many it has provcd itse1f so thoroughly to their souls that no scientific issue could possibly affect its authority for them. This the Men of Science themselves cannot with any justice object to. It is only saying, with an emphasis proportioned to the importance of the subject, what they themselves would say with regard to the different branches of scientific research. Connected as these are, they have their independent proof, which no one hesitates to take as proof, apart from all other testimony whatever: as well as their margins in which they overlap each other. No scientists refuse to consider any point established because all possible connections with every other point have not been ascertaincd; and it would be entirely too much for for anyone to imagine that Scripture is to be tested as if for the first the, by the discoveries or the theories of the nineteenth century. If Scripture be a revelation from God at all, there must be some nearer way to ascertan its truth than by the slow and devious one of geological research; a path, moreover, which is open to the few alone, and not to the many; which excludes altogether the more simple and less educated, except as they may be supposed to take for granted the conclusions of others. But this would be no proof. It would be that very faith in authority which people now deprecate.

Scripture, written for all, appeals to all. It refers for its proof to man's own heart and conscience. It offers itself as that which, as light, manifests itself to those who have eyes to see; as truth, to those who are of the truth as a revelation which reveals; and he who has used the light knows for himself the power of it. "he that believeth on the Son of God hath the witness in himself." This is not credulity; this is not blind confidence in authority. Light is its own evidence, and it is the evidence which faith in Scripture hath in abundance to justify itself to us.

But I pass from this. It is not my purpose now to dwell upon Scripture-evidences ; while the very examination that we are upon will furnish, I do not doubt, many. Let us now take np the main points in which scientific teaching may be thought to come in collision with the Mosaic account of creation.

1. CREATION.
And here the first point will necessarily be the fact of Creation itself; although we are continually told that we may choose it as a hypothesis, if we will. It must be, however, at the cost of all reputation for wisdom. For as Prof. Tyndall tells us, "as far as the eye of science has hitherto ranged through nature, no intrusion of purely Creative power into any series of phenomena has ever been observed." We shall be glad to learn from him how it could be. Scripture certainly knows nothing of creation as a process now going on. It declares that "the works were finished from the foundation of the world." The products of creation are alone, then, what science can deal with ; and it would be interesting to know just what amount of proof of such a fact Dr. Tyndall would require.

Yet the only objection to the Scripture-statement seems to be that "it invokes forces and processes" of which Science can give no account. Natural causation, therefore, is preferable, by reason of its greater simplicity ; and as to the sufficiency of natural causation, Mr. Huxley has told us it is presumptuous to doubt it. To deny its sufficiency, he says, "It is obviously necessary that we should know all the consequences in which all possible combinations, continued through unlimited the, can give rise. If we knew these, and found none competent to originate species, we should have good ground for denying their origin by natural causation ; until we know them, any hypothesis is better than one which involves us in such miserable presumption." "The hypothesis of special creation," he remarks, therefore, "is a mere specious mask for our ignorance." And this is the usual plea. Evolution, in the non-theistic form of it, is nothing else,in fact, than natural causation. Butt here we may be permitted to appeal to what Prof. Tyndall speaks of as vorstellung-faehigkeit, a term which he says, as used by him, means the power of definite mental presentation ; of attaching to words the corresponding object of thought,and of establishing these in their proper relations without the interior haze and soft penumbral borders which the theologian loves, he will be the last, of course, to blame us for insisting upon this here.

What, then, is nature? - this word upon which men of science ring such countless changes? Nature is what natus (born) - the inherent quality of a thing. To use it in Mr. Huxley’s sense may be poetical enough, it surely is not scientific. The penumbral borders are deep and broad enough for any theologian. Nature is the nature of something; it is dependent and derived; it is no creator. It could never produce the thing of which it is the nature. If you mean by it the nature of the universe, you postulate the prior existence of the universe by the very term. If you mean, in fact, the nature of any primary atoms, these must be postulated ; and nature cannot add the smallest atom to their company. The penumbra here, it would seem, is not a "border" merely. Was life among these primary atoms? Dr. Tvndall perhaps would tell us, - nay, he has told us, as to the earth, that "the elements of" it were there, which grouped themselves together into their present form as this planet cooled." Does he know any thing - does science - of these elements? All is confessedly hypothesis here. But it is plain that Dr. Tyndall could not account even for these elements of life by natural causation. He must have the elements first, before he could have the nature at all.

Is natural causation, then, the simpler thought? It is well that it should he understood here what scientific men deem to be the duty of science. I quote from no writer of extreme views when I quote the following: "It may sound strange to some of our readers to be told that it is the duty of the man of science to push back the great first cause in the as far as possible ; nevertheless, this accurately represents the part in the universe which he is called upon to play." A very important part this, no doubt,but this is the best reason that can be given why we are bound, for instance, to prefer the gradual condensation of a solar system from a nebula, to its immediate production by the hand of God. When theistic writers commit themselves to such principles, it is no wonder that many may be found to carry them to their legitimate result; and having been able from the very commencement of things to do without God, should propose to do without him altogether.

This is, in fact, the benefit which such a writer as Mr. Huxley almost openly professes to be derived from Darwinism. Mr. Darwin "has rendered a most remarkable service to philosophical thought," he says, "by enabling the student of nature to recognize to their fullest extent those adaptations to purpose which are so striking in the organic world, and which teleology has done good service in keeping before our minds, without being false to the fundamental principles of a scientific perception of the universe." He has explained the difference a few sentences before : - "Far from imagining that cats exist in order to catch mice well, Darwinism supposes that cats exist because they catch mice well; mousing being not the end, but the condition of their existence." Again, "For the teleologist, an organism exists because it was made for the condition in which it was found; for the Darwinian, an organism exists because, out of many of its kind, it is the only one that has been able to persist in the conditions in which it is found." This is, of course, the annihilation of design, and, at least, of all proof of a designer. I only quote it to show what he considers to be an important service to science. We can understand now why natural causation should be the more "scientific" thought, but it is scarcely the simpler for all that. Once admit God, and you have admitted all that is necessary really to the complete existance of the cosmos as it is; admit natural causation, and every step toward this is accompanied with further difficulties. The competent thought is simpler than the incompetent, assuredly.

Spite of the Darwinian theory, design, however, is evident; and Scripture appeals to it as such. - "For the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse." This is not only Scripture, it is notorious fact. They would scoff at the idea of some chipped flints not being a sufficient proof of man’s existence. Like any other mortals, they would speak of design in their formation, and be teleologists in the ordinary and not in the Darwinian sense. If you spoke to them of natural causation, and of its sufficiency to account for all things, they would rebuke you on the other side with the same confident assurance they ever possess. They have no doubt that in this case they have the work of mind, and can detect it without mistake in the very low forms in which they supposed it to have existed in the anthropoid animals whose existence may be indicated. Here they seem to allow what we contend for. But on the other hand, if these flints were only able to make other flints - if the design in them were only by a good many degrees higher in quality, then they would at once reverse their decision, and see nothing but laws of matter and natural causation, incompetent to make the lower forms. The consistency here is possibly too profound for an ordinary mind to apprehend it, or the vorstellung-faeheigkeit is at fault, and cannot present it to the ordinary mind. In either case, the result is the same. We shall go on to suppose that we find design in nature, and take comfort in the idea that physicists can favour the cool retreat of penumbral borders as well as theologians.

Nay, there is a revolt in the ranks of science itself. People are beginning to speak now of an intelligence which they qualify (very penumbrall ) as "unconscious intelligence." A popular philosophy in Germany at the present the is, the "philosophy of the unconscious;" which, for Hartmann and his followers, is what the "unknowable" is for others amongst ourselves - a kind of God that can be owned or disowned at a breath, and whose worship being, "for the most part, of that silent sort," will not interfere with the researches of the devotee of science. It is hard to know what is unconscious intelligence, and more hard to realize how, by any inductive process, man arrives at the unconsciousness. Just as hard as it is to realize the "unknowable" of Spencer, or how he can exhibit such very precise knowledge where he proclaims none attainable.

If design, then, proves a designer, faith in creation may have grounds to justify it, even apart from Scripture ; and Scripture boldly claims it as a matter of faith, and nothing else. "By faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the Word of God." The the is past when even naturalists can afford to sneer at faith. Huxley’s faith in natural causation we have seen. In the discovery of those very chipped flints of which we have spoken, the discoverer professes to have been guided by "eyes of faith." Nor need we speak more of miracles on the one side than on the other. Creation cannot be against natural law, or at least against any known, for there is none known. The evolution of life as we find it now is invariably from life. Its elements do not group themselves together according to any law that Dr. Tyndall can make evident; nor is natural causation as competent now, in the days of its decrepitude, as Mr. Huxley knows it to have been in the days of its lusty youth. Why should we not, then, believe in creation? The faith of the Christian is not built on what he gets by induction from accumulated facts. That, the truth of which he has proved so well, and is daily proving, - thie Word of God, as he surely knows it, is to him above all the groping of reason in the things transcending it. But when he proclaims his belief, nothing that can he truly called science, has one word of dissent to utter.

2. LIFE IN ITS VARIOUS GRADES.
The next question that will come before us is that as to the nature and introduction of life upon the globe. The nature of life is the great puzzle with the physical school.At present they are determined to classify it, if possible,as part of the universal "force" which they recognize as pervading nature. From the crystal to the living organism, they agree, is but, at any rate, a very small leap; and in the region of the unknown from which they get so many treasures, they can as well as not hypothecate some combination of molecules by which this leap may be effected. Hypotheses are scientific enough, and imagination, as we have been told at full length, has its lawful place in connection with science. It is more simple to assume natural causation than divine ; and this at once settles the matter in favour of the molecules. Facts, however, are stubbornly against them ; and we must here glance at the facts which are on all hands admitted.

It is usual to recognize various kingdoms in nature,with some higher divisions which it has been proposed to call "empires." The inorganic must be thus distinguished from the organic. In a mineral, for instance, there is no combination of parts to form a whole. Its atoms are alike throughout ; and it grows, if it glows at all, not by any internal principle, hut by mere accretion from without. The forces that are manifest in it are those of gravity, or chemical ones only. The properties of the atoms furnish the conditions under which these forces act. Spontaneity is no where present. From such and such a combination such and such results will assuredly follow, and may be calculated on with most definite precision. All is material, and yields itself, as matter will, to the control of mind without resistance. When we come to the vegetable kingdom, we find at once that we are in another sphere.Here too there is matter; here too gravity and chemistry are recognized forces ; but there is something which, at present, at any rate, cannot be resolved into gravity orchemistry. With conjectures we have nothing to do.That this is the fact all must acknowledge perforce. Here there is a principle of growth, whatever it may be - an internal principle which is absolutely characteristic. Thereis power of reproduction, a power different from anything that we can possibly find in the mineral. There is a correlation of parts, which act together for the welfare of the whole. There is a plain mastery exhibited, in a certain measure, over the merely material and chemical forces. This is shown strikingly when death takes place for then the chemical forces escape from such control, and reduce the organism to mere inorganic molecules.

When we turn to the animal kingdom, we find the exhibition of a still higher power; to which the lower, though here and manifest, is again in more or less evident subjection. We can readily recognize the forces of gravity, chemistry, and vitality as all present ; but there is now a true spontaneity - a power of self - direction, which is not apparent in the vegetable. Descending to the region of infinitesimals and invisibles, we may find more or less difficulty in distinguishing, as people have pointed out, the animal from the vegetable. It is usually more difficult to see in the dark. But in the higher forms there is no such difficulty ; and the higher forms, and not the lower, show us the true character of what is here. What we call, in a loose way, mind has come in. For "mind" in a strict sense, we have to rise, spite of the physiologist, to a higher kiugdom - we must come to man. But this we cannot as yet enter into: we must return back to look at these three grades of life a little more distinctly.

It is in connection with the plant and with life, therefore, at its outset, - present wherever life of any kind is found - that we come in contact with that mysterious thing for which the name now popular is protoplasm. A very remarkable thing is protoplasm. Mr. Huxley has done his very best to present it to us as a major compound of certain material elements; but manifestly, the moment he employs chemistry to decide this question, the life must have escaped. He is arguing as if there was no difference between the dead and the living. From all that we can gather of it, looked at as a living thing, protoplasm is now well known to be structureless to the highest powers of the microscope. It is every where the great organizer: it has itself no organs. It has been so commonly talked of, that every one knows that these little masses of protoplasm, invisible save to the microscope, lie imbedded every where in all the tissues, whether of the animal or of the vegetable. They are the living part of these organisms. All the rest is what is called "formed material," and material which the protoplasm itself has formed. Wonderful to say, this has the power of receiving from without the nourishment of whatever kind which is supplied to it, transforming it into its own likeness, and then building up the different structures from itself.

These little masses have power of growth, of multiplication, of movement; and we have, many of us, seen pictures in which they are presented moving in a given direction, as along the strand of a muscle, and leaving behind them as they move a sort of a spider’s web of formed material. No difference can be discerned between one mass of protoplasm and another. Nay, all of them, in any one body, are derived originally, so far as we can see, from a common mass. Yet in spite of this apparent identity, they are, in the more developed organism, very manifestly different in the work that they perform. Each in its place builds up the tissue which is required by the plan of the whole structure, and it builds up no other. That which is set apart to bnild nerve tissue will not build muscle, and that which builds muscle will not build bone.The division of labour is perfectly understood by these little workers, but the labour is steadily devoted to the good of the whole. Each works independently, and yet in fullest harmony with all the rest. Here, surely, there is a thing very different from what we ordinarily apprehend as chemical, inherent in the protoplasm itself, that renders it absolutely necessary to speak of vitality and of vital action. This vital action, as has already been said, controls and counteracts even the chemical action, as death shows; when chemistry prevails again, and putrefaction is the consequence.

As I have said, protoplasm is found wherever life is found. It does not distinguish the animal from the vegetable; although the structures built by it in the animal may be and are more various and complex. But the plant is thus a living thing. As compared, however, with the animal, we find very readily that ordinary lifeless forces have a larger part in it. The plant is nourished simply by what is called endosmose, - a law by which two fluids upon the opposite side of a membrane will diffuse themselves through it in proportion to their different density.The plant is passive here: no animal but what is more or less active in its quest of nourishment. Endosmose has, of course, its place in the animal frame, as I do not forget; but it is a different place. Life, however, in itself does not separate between the animal and the plant. When we come to the animal, we find, if we take Scripture, something more than life, however connected with it.The plant, as we have seen in Genesis i, is a thing "made," not a fresh "creation." The living soul, or animal, is a "creation;" but here we rise out of the sphere of pure physics into a higher one.

The animal has a soul. The soul, however, is not all that it is. It is but one of its constituent parts - the highest; from which, in contrast with mere matter, or with even the vegetable, it gets its name. "Every thing wherein there is a living soul," says Scripture. The soul is a higher power inherent in the bodily organism, closely connected, as is evident, with the life of the body ; directing and controlling, to a certain extent, the bodily powers,just as we have seen vitality itself controlling the chemical. It is the order of nature that the higher should in part control the lower, and yet only in part. There are thus certain bodily functions which we may easily recognize to be under the control of vitality alone. We have seen that bodily structures can be built up without a soul at all. It is important to realize this. It is certain that we have no consciousness or superintendence of what goes on in this way. Nay, in ourselves, any control that we have over it tends often to act injuriously rather than the contrary. Vitality has its own sphere, and an important one. The soul is an added entity which, however now indissolubly connected with the life of the body, has also its own sphere, overlapping to a larger or smaller extent the bodily one.

Again, let us take the animal at its highest, not in its lowest forms. No one but the natnralist would go to the germ in order to find out - just where the microscope and every thing else fails - the character of what is presented. The development of the germ is what makes manifest what is in it. How worse than foolish is it to argue from any apparent identity of the germ at the beginning, that that which develops into an oyster is yet the same as that which develops into a man. Surely the simple fact of development is a clear proof that something, and that the most important for a true definition, must have escaped the microscope or the chemical analysis. Nay, if we even take the lower forms that are developed, how many tendencies are there in these which would never be discerned in their true character except by comparison with those of a higher grade! To find, then, what the animal is, we should rather go to the highest animal than the lowest and least developed, and here we shall find, I doubt not, that Scripture and science agree most perfectly.

Anatomically, the thing which we may consider distinctive of the animal organism is the nervous system. It may be hard to trace this in the lowest forms, but I have said we shall prefer pure daylight to what is obscure. The nervous system is evidently that by which the self - directive power is manifested in the higher animal. It is necessary to spontaneous movement. But there is more than this we have a whole range of things beside, which imagination itself can hardly ascribe to the most developed plant. Sensation is the basis of all these - one thing apart from which none of them can apparently exist. We may distinguish the animal as a sensitive being. It has sensations, and it responds to them. Sensation is not a quality which depends upon the mere possession of life. Life, as we see it in the vegetable, can exist perfectly without it; whereas in Scripture, sensation is ascribed to the soul, and to the body only as connected with it.

This may suffice to distinguish the animal from what is below it. But in order to understand clearly what the animal is, we must learn to distinguish it also from that which is above it, which, in spite of materialism, man is. There is a human kingdom, better perhaps called an empire, distinct as possible from the animal, although in distinguishing it: anatomy and physiology may altogether be at fault. Just as the phenomena of life do not suffice to explain to us the animal organism, which of course man IS possessed of, and in which he resembles other animals, so the powers of the animal, while yet he possesses them, do not suffice to explain the highest powers of man.

Man, if we still cleave to Scripture, has a spirit as well as a soul and with this spirit is identified the "knowledge of the things of a man, " - reflection, judgment, the moral faculties. It will be objected by some that Scripture also speaks of the "spirit of the beast." (Eccl. iii.21.) there is one place alone in which it does so, but not as giving any positive doctrine on the subject. It is, as the large part of the book of Eccelesiastes is, human conjecture and reasoning only. It is what a man, though he might be the wisest of men, said in his heart at a certain time. It is given as that, to put his condition of perplexity in which he has fallen, and into which every one else will fall who seeks, with him, simply "to search out by wisdom concerning all things that are done under heaven." Man’s wisdom is here at fault, just as in the book of Job man’s goodness is found wanting also. The wisest man here, the best there, has to confess his folly and his vileness before God. Looking at things in this human way, death is for us the great mystery - the thing which levels man with beast and wisdom with folly. Here, then, is this thought at this, thet "Man has no pre-eminence above the beast." It is just because "that which befalls the sons of men befalls the beast; as the one dieth, so dieth the other." he adds, "Yea, they have all one ruach" - the word which in Hebrew stands for both breath and spirit. Its vagueness, therefore, here answers this purpose better than any more precise definition. Death is here before him, and, as far as the eye sees, "all go unto one place: all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again." Now comes the question : "Who knoweth the spirit [ruach!] of man that goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast that goeth downward to the earth?" It is human conjecture, not divine knowledge; and whether the human ruach (which is, in fact, spirit) is distinct from the ruach of the beast (which is, in fact, breath) he knows not. At the end of the book there is, however, distinctly given to us the exact opposite of this.It is of man that he says, speaking of death also, "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was, and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it." Thus the spirit does not go downward to the earth; it is distinguished by this fact from the reach of the beast.

The passage here, then, if duly weighed, will only make more manifest the Scripture-distinction between man and beast.

The mental or moral powers are ascribed to the spirit in Scripture; although in man the region of the spirit overlaps that of the soul, just as we have seen the soul overlapping the vital sphere and the vital overlapping and governing the chemical.Let us take a few passages as to the soul and spirit, that we may see how differently Scripture characterizes them. Thus the soul is the seat of the affections (Gen.xxxiv. 8. ) - "The soul of my son longeth for your daughter ; " "The soul of Jonathan was knit to the soul of David" (1 Sam. xviii. 1.). Hatred is ascribed to it, as is love, - "The blind that are hated of David’s soul" (2 Sam. v. 8.); "My soul loathed them" (Zech. xi. 8.). The soul is the seat of the appetites of the body (Ps. cvii. 18.) -"Their soul abhorreth all manner of meat;" (Prov. xxvii. 7)- "The full soul loatheth the honey-comb;" (xxix. 8.) - "He fainteth, and his soul hath appetite " (Lam. i. 11.) - " Meat to relieve the soul." So the derived meanings of the word, as given in our ordinary version, "appetite" (Prov. xxiii. 2 ; Ecel. vi. 7.), "pleasure" (Dent. xxiii. 24; Ps. cv. 22.), "desire" (Jer. xliv. 11; Mic. vii. 3.), and "mind "but in the sense of will or intention and not of the understanding,1 Sam. ii. 35; 2 Kings ix. 15.

The spirit is used in a very different way. I have before quoted the main passage in 1 Cor. ii. 11, - "What man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him." It is also the common word for "mind" (Prov. xxix. Ii. ) - "A fool uttereth all his mind;" (Ezek. ii. 5. ) - "1 know the things that come into your mind;" (Dan. V. 2t).) - "The mind hardened in pride;" Isaiah xi. 4, it is translated "understanding."

Thus there is a uniform sense which these words have in Scripture, and we all understand well its consistency with that which has been before noted, - that God is the "God" and the "Father of spirits," and not of souls. He is the God of those able to apprehend and to respond to Him: He is the Father of those who have in their own spirit the likeness of his being which is spirit.

If we turn to what Science says, or what we can gather naturally from things, we shall find the same distinctions, if we do not find the things which are the basis of them. I prefer at thus point to use the language of another rather than my own - the language of one whose scientific competence can hardly be questioned, and who evidently has in no wise the scriptural statement before him when he uses it. Prof. Mivart distinguishes two classes of powers in man. The highest class he characterizes as follows: "First, a power of directly perceiving and reflecting upon our continued personal activity an existence - sensations and perceptions being reflected on by thought and recognized as our own, and we ourselves being recognized as affected and perceiving - self-consciousness. Secondly, a power of actively recalling past thoughts or experiences - intellectual memory. Thirdly, a power of reflecting upon our sensations and perceptions, and asking what they are and why they are: of apprehending abstract ideas; of perceiving truth directly or by ratiocination, and also goodness. Fourthly, a power of, on certain occasions, deliberately electing to act either with, or in opposition to, the apparent resultant of involuntary attractions and repulsions - will. Fifthly, a power of giving expression by signs to general conceptions and abstract ideas; a power of enunciating deliberate judgments by articulate sounds - language. These powers result in actions, which are deliberate operations implying the use of a self-conscious, reflective, representative faculty."

Besides these highest psychical powers, he enumerates the following powers and activities also: "First, vegetative powers of nutrition, growth, and reproduction. Secondly, a power of responding to unfelt stimuli by means of nervous interconnections - reflex action. Thirdly, a power of inadvertently performing appropriate actions in response to felt stimuli; such actions, termed instinctive, being provided for before hand by the special organization of the body. Fourthly, a power of experiencing sensible pleasure and pain. Fifthly, a power of indeliberately perceiving sensible objects, of which some start or exclamation may be the sign - sensible perception. Sixthly, a power of effecting the coalesence, agglutination, and combination of sensitives in more or less complex aggregations, and so simulating inference. Seventhly, a power of automatic or organic memory which may exhibit itself in unintellectual imitation. Eighthly, a power of responding by appropriate actions to pleasurable and painful sensations and emotions - organic volition. Ninthly, a power of experiencing vague pleasurable and painful feelings - emotional sensibility. Tenthly, a power of expressing such feelings by signs or by gestures understood by our fellows, and replied to by corresponding sounds and gestures - emotional language."

The first of this latter class of powers - the vegetative ones - is, as the name implies, the result simply of the possession of life. The rest are as characteristic of the soul as Scripture defines it as the former class of higher powers are of the spirit as defined in Scripture also. I might quote others with regard to these distinctions, but this will suffice. Mr. Mivart remarks that as to the instinct of animals, "their highest psychical faculties appear to answer very closely to the above indeliberate human faculties: and thus we come to see, not only what instinct differs from, but also what it resembles." We are thus able to differentiate the soul from that which is above it, as we have already seen it differentiated from the mere vegetative life which is below it.

Life, soul, spirit. are thus without much difficulty to be distinguished from one another. It is remarkable that if we take the brain itself, which, of course, we have in common with at least the higher beasts, the latest science of the day makes it doubtful as to whether the cerebral lobes themselves, and even the frontal which are most inquestion, have any thing directly to do with the higher class of faculties which Prof. Mivart has described to us. For the expression of them outwardly, they are of course necessary, as the nervous system generally is. Prof. Ferner, the latest investigator, speaks only conjecturally here and his own researches, since confirmed by those of many others, show conclusivelv that large portions of the brain are devoted to mere muscular motions of the face and head. It is little, therefhre, for Mr. Huxley or another to compare the brain of an ape with the brain of man. Even here there are great differences, although all the parts in the one are doubtless to he found in the other. But this is no more than saying that man has the animal structure which the beast has. That which makes him "man" is above the analysis of the knife or microscope.

No one who will reflect upon what we have had now before us, but will observe that sort of consistency which belongs to trnth, and which nothing short of truth could be expected to have and yet, as already remarked, what we have in Scripture is no laboured argument to prove this, or any argument at all. It does not even dwell on such things as these, or bring them into any special prominence. It is content to leave them where man, if he chooses, can search and find ; and if those who have busied themselves so much with the investigation of nature had only taken half the pains to investigate Scripture upon these subjects, they might have found, not only the harmony which they deny, but the real key also to many things which, for the want of the key, remain, and are likely to remain, questions merely I pass on now to other things.